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ADDRESS
WHY SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW -
A DIALOGUE*
SANFORD H. KADISH**
N THIS DIALOGUE I HA VE TRIED TO ADDRESS criticisms of the subs tan-
tive criminal law, as a course and as a subject matter, made by a num-
ber of my students over several decades of teaching the subject. In a
way it is rather personal since it consists of the criticisms of my stu-
dents and my apologia for what I have tried to do. That, however, would
hardly be worth doing unless it is the case, as I believe it is, that these
criticisms are widespread and that my responses speak to what is gen-
erally done in criminal law courses in this country.
I thought it worthwhile to do this for two reasons. One, because it
seemed a fair challenge to see if I could produce answers that were at
least satisfactory to me. Second, because I think it is helpful to the
educational enterprise for law professors to talk to their students about
their subject, as well as on their subject.
The subject of this piece suggested its dialogue form, for as I thought
about it, my head was filled with echoes of fragments of conversations I
have had with many students-or Walter Mitty-like, imagined I should
like to have had.
Student. I just returned from a clinical stint with the Public Defender
and I have a lot of questions about the substantive criminal law in
general and its teaching in particular.
Professor. Shall we start with the law itself or with its teaching and
place in the curriculum?
S. I find it hard to sort out my questions in those categories, they
overlap so much. Let me start with what struck me at the Public De-
fender's office. No one worried much about the substantive criminal law.
In fact, there was not much law involved, period. There was mainly
wheeling and dealing, but I will get to that later. Anyway, I did memos
about search and seizure, stop and frisk, police interrogation, and the
like, but I never had to write on the rules of criminal law. There was no
reason to. The guy was charged with making a drug sale, or with going
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after someone with an iron pipe or a knife, or with mugging an old man,
or grabbing a woman's purse and running off with it. The substantive
law was no problem. There was nothing to argue about. What we spent
our time on was the facts, the evidence, and the proof. The most impor-
tant question was whether we could exclude some damaging evidence
because of police misconduct. I figured that maybe my experience was
unusual, so I asked around. Turns out it was not unusual at all. The old
pros said that that was the way it always went. So why did I spend most
of my first course in criminal law studying areas criminal lawyers do not
use much and comparatively little time with the subjects they use day
in and day out?
P. I take it your complaint is that the subject taught is impractical.
S. Right, and a waste of time too.
P. I do not see it that way at all. First, you have to admit that before
you graduate, you will have had an opportunity to take courses in the
areas of law you regard as practical -specifically the specialized courses
in criminal procedure and evidence. Even if our objective was to train
you to be a defender or prosecutor, it does not follow that we should do
it all in one course, in the first year.
S. No of course not, but you would at least want to make a start, and I
do not see how the course in criminal law does that.
P. Sure you do, if the defender or the prosecutor were not familiar
with the elements of crimes, including the often tricky mens rea issues,
as well as what conduct is prohibited, and the many possible defenses,
they could not function. The daily grist of the urban criminal courts
does not regularly pose many major substantive legal problems, but
well trained lawyers can often find them. The major advances in sub-
stantive criminal law, apart from statutes, come from cases in which
defendants are represented by broadly educated lawyers with rich
sophistication in the subtlety and complexity of the criminal law. Take
the innovative use of duress or necessity as a defense to charges of
prison escape, or the effort to enlarge the defense of insanity to include
incapacity produced by severe social disadvantage, or the attempt to
assimilate drug or alcohol addiction to the defense of the involuntary
act. Even beyond that, there is more to the practice of criminal law than
the routine grist of the urban courts. Consider, for example, the com-
plex problems for defense and prosecution alike in the growing use of
the law of conspiracy to deal with racketeering and other forms of
organized crime; or in the defense of mistake of law to charges of law-
breaking by governmental officials; or of increasing efforts to enforce
criminal sanctions against corporations. No indeed, even for students
who plan to make criminal law practice their area, I cannot agree that
the substantive criminal law course is plainly impractical.
S. Well sure, you can give examples like that, but the course is not
devoted just to those things. Most of it, or at least a great deal of it,
deals with matters you would have a hard time justifying as practical.
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P. If you mean to say that a good part of what you study is not direct-
ly useful in a lot of the criminal practice, I have to agree. But as you
must have noticed from your other courses, it is not our purpose merely
to offer you immediate practical training in the handling of routine
cases. That would be a great waste and would make it doubtful whether
we could justify being part of a university. For example, the property
law course is not directed toward forming property law practitioners,
nor is the torts class designed to equip you to be negligence lawyers.
Sure, we are in business to educate lawyers, but that means a great deal
more than giving you the knowledge and skills to practice in particular
areas. We are laying the foundation for your legal education, to be fur-
ther developed later in law school and beyond. Look at it this way:
would requiring criminal law make sense if we thought we were just
training criminal practitioners in that course? Surely not. Our students
will be public interest lawyers, corporate lawyers, tort lawyers, and tax
lawyers; many will also be judges and legislators. Some students will
even be law professors. Even those who become criminal lawyers will
not be just defenders and prosecutors; they will constitute a group of
specialists with great knowledge of and a great stake in a vitally signifi-
cant institution whose workings make a tremendous difference to the
lives of countless people and the welfare of our society. Does it make
sense to fashion a required course in criminal law for all these people
narrowly directed to training for criminal practice? We have other ob-
jectives in mind beside training people to operate the machinery of ur-
ban criminal courts.
S. Could you spell out those objectives a bit more clearly?
P. Sure. The first of those objectives is to contribute to your general
legal education, quite apart from the criminal law. The concepts of crimi-
nal law are splendid vehicles for rigorous legal analysis, for generaliz-
ing, distinguishing, and searching for contradiction and consistency-
legal and factual impossibility, preparation and attempt, mens rea,
intention, voluntary act, and causation. The subject provides an oppor-
tunity to work with statutory materials not too complex for a beginner.
It allows for the comparison of adjudication and legislation as two
means of changing and developing the law. It confronts the student with
how the law can approach resolution of issues where deeply held values
are so in conflict that there is peril and loss whichever move one makes.
And one of its central issues is exploring the ramifications of a person's
moral fault and responsibility for what happens, and for what others do
as a consequence of one's own actions-a pervasive issue in all private
law.
There is a lot more to be said on this, but I do not want this discussion
to sound too much like a curriculum committee meeting. Let me advance
another objective of much larger import derived from the significance of
substantive criminal law to the community and to individuals.
I cannot do better in making this point than to quote from an eloquent
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statement by Professor Herbert Wechsler, used as an epigraph to a
criminal law casebook you may be familiar with.
Whatever views one holds about the penal law, no one will
question its importance in society. This is the law on which men
place their ultimate reliance for protection against all the deep-
est injuries that human conduct can inflict on individuals and in-
stitutions. By the same token penal law governs the strongest
force that we permit official agencies to bring to bear on individ-
uals. Its promise as an instrument of safety is matched only by
its power to destroy. If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic
human interests are in jeopardy. If it is harsh or arbitrary in its
impact, it works a gross injustice on those caught within its
toils. The law that carries such responsibilities should surely be
as rational and just as law can be. Nowhere in the entire legal
field is more at stake for the community or for the individual.
In the light of this, it seems essential that law schools try to educate
their students broadly and deeply in the criminal law, for it is our future
lawyers who will have the most to say about how the system works and
how just, rational, and effective it will be.
S. Now, I do not disagree with that at all. I just cannot see how it
follows that we should devote the major part of the first year course to
the substantive criminal law rather than to the great issues of criminal
law today-urban crime and its relation to ghetto life; race and crime;
the injustices in our society that produce crime; the degradation of our
prisons and jails; corruption in government; the arrogance and brutality
of police; . ..
P. Wait, wait. I get your point. I am not denying these issues are mat-
ters of great importance. Still and all, this is a law school and it is a first
year law course we are talking about. If we take the subject to be the
phenomenon of crime and societal responses to it in America today,
there is very little that could not justifiably be included. If we were to
address these matters seriously and not as an exercise in ideological
polemics, it would be necessary to assess historical and cultural issues,
problems of sociology, economics and social psychology. The inquiries
would require careful empirical work as well as thorough examination of
theoretical and methodological considerations. That is a tall order for a
class of harried beginning law students struggling with three or four
other courses. I agree that the criminal law, like all law, is a product of
social organization with deep roots in human and social behavior. To
some degree it is possible to call attention to some of the ways this is so.
But to do more in a basic criminal law course, as opposed to advanced
seminars in manageable pieces of the puzzle, would tend to sacrifice the
1 Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1097,
1097-98 (1952).
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study of law as a distinctive institution. Of course we should deal with
the criminal law critically and deeply, but I do not think we err in mak-
ing law the central focus.
S. But how does that make the case for substantive criminal law? On
that view, the centerpiece of the course should be the administration of
justice in this country-the law governing police practices and their en-
forcement through the exclusionary rule, the developing law with re-
spect to prisoners rights, and so on. This is law, not the whole realm of
human and social behavior, but it is the law that really connects with
the life of individuals and the quality of our society. And it just so hap-
pens it is practical as well, which even you would not count as a disad-
vantage, I should think.
P. No, of course not. I do not underestimate the significance of these
matters. We do teach them, as I said, sometimes as part of first year
criminal law, often as advanced courses in criminal procedure and
specialized seminars. The issue between us is not the importance of the
administration of the law, but the importance of the substantive law.
We have to consider why the substantive criminal law is also justified
on the criteria we are talking about now, that is, why it also connects, as
you say, with matters of great social concern.
S. Alright, why?
P. The substantive criminal law connects with matters of great social
concern because upon it all of our criminal and penal institutions rest.
You regard the administration of justice as important. It is. But what is
being administered? Surely not justice as an abstract goal-you, I
gather, would be the last to say that. What is it then, if not the substan-
tive criminal law? There can be no authorized police inquiry, arrest,
prosecution, conviction, or sentence which is not based on the rules and
doctrines of the substantive criminal law. This is the law which finally
legitimates or fails to legitimate what is done by the agencies of crimi-
nal justice. It does so in two basic ways. First, it defines who is account-
able, on pain of punishment, for what actions in what circumstances.
Secondly, it defines by implication-a very consequential implication-
all the other actions and circumstances in which people are not subject
to the sanctions of the law. These two functions are crucial for the
security of the people and the stability of society. What would you have
without the substantive law? Only the unrestrained exercise of force by
public officials upon anyone and for such purposes as they happen to
decide upon. At best, officials would take it upon themselves to do the
right thing, as they might view it.
S. But that is precisely what does happen in practice. That is why I
wonder how much difference it makes what the doctrines and defini-
tions of the criminal law happen to be. The discretionary judgments of
officials pretty well undercut the role of the substantive criminal law
you are speaking about. Police detain and arrest not just by the book,
but by their own notions of how law enforcement can best be advanced.
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Prosecutors exercise broad freedom on whether and what to charge.
Defendants get convicted of crimes through free-wheeling bargaining
between prosecutor and defense counsel, rather than through an objec-
tive assessment of the distinctions made by the criminal law. Even
when cases go to trial, I cannot believe juries are much affected by the
elaborate and confusing instructions they get on the doctrines of the
criminal law. Even lawyers and judges have a tough time with them. In
the end, juries convict or acquit on how it all strikes them. And in
sentencing, judges have such a wide choice once the defendant is con-
victed of some crime that it often does not make a great deal of differ-
ence of what crime the person is convicted.
P. There is much in what you say. But I must say, with respect, you
mistake what it all goes to prove. First, in decrying excessive discretion
as you do, your premise has to be that the rules of law should control
discretion, but do not. That concedes the importance of substantive law
in any proper criminal law system. Your arguments make a case for study-
ing how and where the rules become eclipsed by uncontrolled discretion
and what can be done about it. They do not make a case for not studying
critically the criteria governing determinations of guilt and punishment,
which, after all, are just what the substantive law consists of.
Beyond that, however, you make too much of the fact that rules of law
do not always operate in practice the way they are designed to operate.
From this, it does not follow that the rules do not matter at all. Take the
free-wheeling bargaining you refer to. Surely the substantive rules of
law do operate here-not in an adjudicatory context to be sure, but in a
settlement context in which judgments of the applicable rules and the
proveable facts set the framework for the negotiation. True, the sub-
stantive law does matter less because of the discretionary elements in
the system you point to, and any sensible examination of the rules of
law would extend to how far they are blunted in practice. But do they
matter so much less that they lose the significance I attribute to them? I
do not think so.
Look at it this way. Taking the criminal law as a body of specifica-
tions of who may be prosecuted and convicted for what crimes in what
circumstance and subject to what punishment, you can ask two ques-
tions about their effect in practice. First, do they serve in practice to
prevent the imposition of criminal sanctions for conduct not made crimi-
nal? Second, do they control the actions of officials within the ambit of
what is proscribed?
Consider the first question. If it were the case that in practice the
specifications of the criminal law were disregarded in the sense that
people were systematically prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced be-
yond what they authorized, your point would be strong. But this is not
the case, and I do not think that you are saying it is. Persons cannot be
prosecuted and convicted of what is not made criminal, and they cannot
be punished beyond what the law allows. The courts function in prac-
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tice, not just in theory, to prevent excesses of these sorts. Juries, for ex-
ample, may as you say, have trouble with the legal instructions because
they do not understand them or because they just do not like them, but
no verdict of guilty can stand unless the court concludes a reasonable
jury could find it on the law beyond a reasonable doubt. So, even if we
look at the rules of the criminal law as marking the outer perimeter of
criminality and punishability, and put aside the distinctions it makes
within those perimeters, the criminal law has the telling import I at-
tribute to it. Its existence serves to protect the individual against
punishment by the state, not just on the books, but in practice. This is
the distinctive function of the whole criminal code-its definitions of
criminal actions, culpable states of mind, doctrines of liability, as well as
its doctrines of excuse and justification.
Consider the positions commonly taken by law students-that the law
of rape should be enlarged; that the rules of corporate criminality
should be changed to facilitate convictions of corporate wrong-doing;
that environmental spoilation should be made criminal; that the criminal
law should be extended over economic offenses; that such defenses as
mistake of law and official authorization should be narrowed to avoid
the escape of governmental officials who direct criminal activities; that
the possession of firearms should be made criminal; that the lawful use
of deadly force in law enforcement should be narrowed. Surely you
agree that these proposals can make a real difference, and that those
urging them are not wasting everyone's time with things that do not
matter.
The same is equally true of areas where the law arguably goes too far
in defining conduct as criminal. Need I remind you of the debate over
decriminalizing such conduct as the use of marijuana and other drugs,
deviant sexual behavior, or prostitution? I do not think you would
regard these issues as inconsequential because of the large elements of
discretion in the system.
Let me go back to pick up the second question I raised about the ef-
fect of the substantive criminal law in practice - the extent to which the
distinctions among kinds of criminality and degrees of punishment ac-
tually determine the behavior of law enforcing agencies. Here your
point is the strongest. As you say, the vast amount of discretion by
prosecutors and the prevalence of plea bargaining distort the legislative
patterns. The precise crime or crimes committed by the defendant, as
measured by the criminal law on the books, may be very different from
the crime the defendant is convicted of as a result of prosecutorial
discretion, plea bargaining and jury compromising. Moreover, the
defendant may be sentenced far less severely than the law allows. I
want to stress, however, that the difference lies in the defendant being
convicted and punished for less than the law authorizes, not more. The
prosecutor, for example, can not bargain credibly for more than the law
authorizes, not at least if the defendant is properly represented.
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Now, I have to concede that discretionary judgments sometimes dis-
tort the legal distinctions over shades of criminality found in the sub-
stantive in the law. An example of this is Professor Zimring's study of
those convicted of varying classes of culpable homicide in Pennsylvania.2
The study showed that the discretionary elements in the system pro-
duced a pattern of conviction and punishment strikingly at odds with
the grading of culpable homicide mandated by the homicide statute and
its judicial interpretations. But what follows from this fact is that a
rounded treatment of substantive rules and doctrines of the criminal
law should include treatment of those features of the working system
that tend to frustrate or distort the system's design. One would want to
look at those features critically. To what extent are they dispensable ir-
rationalities, adhered to because of economy or sheer expedience or
inertia, as is often said of plea bargaining? To what extent do they
represent a judgment that equity and discretion are indispensable to a
just criminal law, as is often said of juries? In either event, what should
be done differently in formulating criminal doctrines to account for
these discretionary features?
You see, I concede the force of part of what you say, but I cannot con-
cede that the existence of these discretionary features renders unreal
and unworthy of critical study the law's distinctions in shades of guilt or
punishment. While strict rule-of-law determinations do not always work
in practice-because of imperfections in administration or because they
can not altogether do so without displacing a desired flexibility-it does
not follow that formulating rules is a waste of time. Of course rules
influence prosecutors and jurors in varying degrees. We want to know
how and why their influence varies to enable us to improve the law's ef-
fectiveness. This is a vital question of means. But we also have to refine
and articulate those differential judgments of fault and punishability
that make for a more just criminal law. Only by so doing can we dis-
cover how we want judgments to be made, that is, the criteria we want
to govern in place of the discretion exercised by criminal justice agen-
cies. This is a question of ends.
S. Yes, but even accepting all that, are these restraints what the
criminal law is mainly about, or is it rather the exercise of coercive
power by the state to make people conform? We talk about what people
may be punished for and for how much and in what circumstances.
Underlying all this talk is the premise that punishing people is an accep-
table and justifiable thing for our society to do. I do not accept that
premise.
P. Why do you have to? You are not the first person to doubt that
punishment actually deters others from crime, that we can justly use
offenders for this purpose, that retribution is a defensible basis for
punishment, or to prefer rehabilitative approaches to punishment. Of
2 Zimring, Punishing Homicide, 43 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 227 (1976).
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course these matters are not to be taken for granted. They should be
high on the agenda of any course in criminal law.
S. No, that is not what bothers me. I am not one who believes there is
no evil in the world or that evil-doers should not be punished. On the
contrary. My point is that the principal evil in our society is done by
those who control the criminal law-including those who write it and
those who enforce it. The well-to-do and the powerful are the chief bene-
ficiaries of the criminal law. The poor, the powerless, the outsider, racial
and ethnic minorities-these are its chief victims. The criminal law is an
instrument whereby those in power preserve society as it is, with all its
injustices. When we study it as you would have us do, raising the ques-
tions you would have us raise, you are asking us to act and think as if it
were otherwise. I regard that as an immoral enterprise and I resent be-
ing drawn into it.
P. Will you forgive me if I say you are overreacting? Do you really
think that no punishment of anyone can be morally justified in America
today-not rapists, or child molesters, or the Watergate prepetrators,
or law-breaking corporations and those who run them, or polluters, or
corrupt politicians? Come on, your gripe is that we do not punish
enough, and that itself is an injustice. Is that not so? You do not have
such persons in mind when you make your point about the injustice of
punishment. But don't you have to?
And how about those others you do have in mind? Would our society
be better if people who kill or assault others, or steal their possessions,
or rob them, or invade their homes, or purvey dangerous addictive
drugs, if these people were not punished? Do not think for a minute it is
just the privileged white middle class which is victimized by these
crimes. Speak to families trying to make it in the ghettos of our cities.
You will learn otherwise.
I know you have sympathy with the great mass of offenders who
populate our awful jails and prisons. You see who they are and where
they come from and you lay the responsibility at the door of society.
You blame poverty, unemployment, racial prejudice and discrimination.
These social injustices are real, but after all, it was not the criminal law
which produced them.
S. No, but our criminal laws help to maintain them.
P. I am sorry, I just do not understand that. How does society perpe-
trate poverty, prejudice, and oppression by prosecuting and punishing
people who assault and rob other people?
S. I will tell you how-by totally distracting people from where the
real problem lies; by turning their attention from the root causes of
these crimes in social injustice to the overt symptoms of these evils. It
is all so easy. Criminals are evil, hateful individuals, so all you need is a
dose of law and order to set things right. Arrest them, convict them,
and lock them away in vile and degrading jails and prisons, and if crime
continues do the same for more of them for longer terms.
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P. Well, I hope I do not have to defend a simplistic law-and-order men-
tality in order to defend the institution of criminal law. I think it is true
that public opinion and the legislatures that reflect it do tend to react
that way. One hopes that our graduates will have a more sophisticated
view. All the same, it strikes me as equally simplistic to dwell exclu-
sively on social injustice as the cause of crime. First, while no one
doubts the connections between crime and poverty, discrimination and
other social injustices, it is not at all clear how close these connections
are. No one has succeeded in establishing the etiology of crime in any
single factor. Second, whatever the causes, crime is a source of profound
fear, insecurity, and injury to people in this country. They may legiti-
mately demand protection against it, through our laws, while the pro-
cess of finding and dealing with its causes goes on.
But all this was by way of saying why I thought your moral distaste
for the criminal law was misplaced. I would like now to make a more
daring claim. I suggest to you that it is precisely for those who are most
sensitive to issues of moral rights that the substantive criminal law
should have the greatest appeal. May I ask you this: feeling as you do,
how is it that you do not have similar distaste for criminal procedure?
S. I am not sure. Partly because it strikes me as practical-something
I am going to be using whenever I have a criminal matter. But maybe
there is more to it. Perhaps, it is the way in which criminal procedure is
taught nowadays. It is mainly about constitutional prohibitions on the
law enforcement process, and these prohibitions involve basic rights of
individuals against the government-search and seizure, interrogation,
right to counsel, self-incrimination. In a way, it is a course in civil liber-
ties.
P. All right, I want to claim the same for the substantive criminal law
course. It too is a course in civil liberties. Underlying the great bulk of
the doctrines of the criminal law is the conception of personal responsi-
bility. This is no artificial construct of the criminal law. It is deeply
rooted in our moral sense of fitness that punishment entails blame and
that, therefore, punishment may not justly be imposed where the per-
son is not blameworthy. The whole so-called general part of the criminal
law, as well as the mens rea definitions in the special part, are devoted
to articulating the minimum conditions for the attribution of blame and
the various features of conduct that warrant differential judgments of
blameworthiness.
One finds instances where punishment seems to be imposed in the
absence of blame-strict liability for example, or more arguably, liabil-
ity for negligence. One also finds instances where people are punished
for what they are not to blame, rather than for what they are to blame
-felony murder, for example. But note the arguments offered to sup-
port these instances. They are either that, contrary to common belief,
blame is appropriate, or that these are exceptional situations in which
the exigencies of law enforcement outweigh the injustice of punishing
[Vol. 29:1
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol29/iss1/17
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
the individual. The moral claim of the individual that he may not be sub-
jected to punishment where he cannot be said to be blameworthy, as
judged by our fundamental conceptions of morality and corrective
justice, is a central issue to be faced in every case even when it is found
not to be controlling.
If you conceive the doctrines of criminal law as I am suggesting, you
will find the issue of moral accountability everywhere. Indeed, nowhere
are its conditions more systematically examined and refined than in the
substantive criminal law. When and why does it affect liability that the
defendant misunderstood the situation? When a harm ensues that would
not have happened had the defendant not acted as he did, is the defend-
ant to be held for that result? Certainly not always, but whatever the
formulas-proximate cause, concurrent cause, etc.-the governing ques-
tion is whether our moral ideas of causation permit the defendant to be
held accountable for the result. Consider the doctrines of accomplice lia-
bility. It is no accident that the doctrines mainly track our moral judg-
ments of when one person may be held accountable for the actions of
others, and only when they do not, do they become problematical.
Then there is the law of excuses, which plainly has its roots in concep-
tions of moral accountability. When and why do we afford a defense
where the defendant has acted under the threats of another; or when he
has acted under the influence of alcohol; or when he acted in a haze after
a blow? Again the notion of the injustice of blame when the person could
not have done otherwise is central to any resolution of these issues.
Consider also the defense of legal insanity, why do we have such a
defense except for our feeling that it would be morally intolerable to
punish persons who are not responsible. Indeed, the problem of defining
the legally insane continues to be controversial, but it is plain that the
dispute over the various tests centers around means, not ends -how
best to identify for the jury those features of a person's mental abnor-
mality that are relevant to an assessment of his moral responsibility:
that he did not know what he was doing, that he did not know it was
wrong, that he could not conform to the requirements of the law.
S. Are you really saying that the doctrines of the criminal law mirror
our moral judgments about the justice of punishing particular individ-
uals?
P. I regret the hint of skepticism in your observation, but the answer
is yes, in part. But only in part. The criminal law is not a moral code. It
is a code of law which has to be administered practically to accomplish
its purpose. In most any criminal law-certainly in our own-com-
promises are made in the name of effectiveness and administration. I
already pointed out an instance of this, strict criminal liability, but sure-
ly there are many others. Indeed, I would think that very few provisions
of the law are precisely what would be indicated by moral considera-
tions of personal responsibility. Take for example the whole resort to
what is called an objective standard, as it operates in defining culpable
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negligence, or as it operates in the various excuses to criminal conduct.
A strictly moral approach would condition blame on what could be ex-
pected of the particular individual, not on what could be expected of a
reasonable person. As Holmes observed, if moral ground were to control
punishment "the first thing to be considered would be those limitations
in the capacity for choosing rightly which arise from abnormal instincts,
want of education, lack of intelligence, and all the other defects which
are most marked in the criminal classes."3 If one imposed liability for
unintended or unforeseen consequences, one would want to know
whether the defendant exercised that care of which he was capable; in
defining the defense of duress one would ask whether the defendant ex-
ercised the self-control of which he was capable, rather than that of a
person of reasonable firmness.
But you see the problem. How do we determine what the defendant
was capable of? When you are discussing moral issues abstractly, you
do not face this dilemma. You can simply conclude that if the person
could have taken care and did not, then he is morally censorable, but not
otherwise. However, the criminal law does not allow this. The court and
jury must decide, not conditionally but absolutely, whether the defend-
ant is guilty. What do you do when you lack the means to make reliable
judgments of facts on which moral blame rests? One possibility-and it
is commonly what our criminal law does-is to make compromises and
approximations. You ask the jury to decide not if the defendant exer-
cised the care or the power of resistance he was capable of (how could
they reliably know?), but whether he exercised the care or power of
resistance a reasonable person would be capable of. That way you have
a test a jury can administer. Administrability, I might add, is no minor
consideration in dealing with possible defenses that rest altogether on
the personality and character of the defendant. For without an objective
element, there are no ascertainable limits to these defenses and the
deterrent threat of punishment could be seriously weakened.
A rather nice example is the defense of legal insanity. Periodically
there are serious proposals to abolish the defense. Sometimes abolition
is proposed by those who see it as a loophole in the law through which
the guilty escape punishment. At other times it is proposed by those
who see it as a cruel hoax whereby some offenders are subjected to a
worse and longer confinement in so-called hospitals than they would be
in a prison. These are not captious arguments. What accounts for the
lineage and durability of the insanity defense is a very fundamental
moral conception of the wrongness of imposing the stigma of punish-
ment on those who cannot fairly be blamed.
At the same time the defense has never been defined altogether as its
rationale would require. Is it not possible that a person, to take the
30. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 45 (1881).
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terms of the most widely accepted test, may lack knowledge of the
wrongfulness of his act or be unable to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law, even though he has no medically identifiable
mental disease or defect? Why insist, then, on such a disease as a neces-
sary condition of the defense? The explanation lies in the weight ac-
corded expediency in the administration of the criminal justice system.
Without tying the defense to mental disease, the defense is limitless and
unascertainable-we have no means of distinguishing those who would
not from those who could not. The requirement of mental disease does
not assure our ability to make the distinction, but it serves at least to
confine the exception to punishability to a narrow band of offenders and
provides some basis for managing an otherwise unworkable distinction.
S. So you end up giving me more evidence of how the criminal law pur-
sues its goals through invasion of the moral rights of individuals. That is
what I keep trying to tell you about your favorite subject. It is the
nature of the beast and maybe it is necessary in some sense, but I have
no heart for it.
P. Well, I am saying that utilitarian considerations sometimes prevail
over justice to the individual, but I do not think that justifies your feel-
ings about the criminal law. Let me briefly state three reasons why.
First, it is not the case that law enforcement exigencies systematically
prevail over justice to the individuals. If that were the case, we would
have a very different criminal law than we have today, without mens
rea, excuses, or any concessions to the plight of the individual. Second,
the value of personal justice is always present as an extremely powerful
reason to shape the law in one way. It is always a central issue to be
dealt with in study and criticism of the criminal law, or in confronting
substantive issues in litigation by prosecutor and defense counsel.
Sometimes it prevails, sometimes it is compromised, occasionally it is
given no force. The criminal doctrine that emerges is in most cases at
least influenced by recognition of this value of personal justice. Third, it
is not always wrong to give weight to considerations of more effective
law enforcement. Certainly the majority of my students would agree
when the conduct that is made criminal is of particular concern to them.
I hear few complaints from students about imposing strict liability on
persons or corporations who package unfit or mislabeled drugs or foods,
or who commit pollution by their industrial processes; and I hear strong
arguments from many students for eliminating any requirement that a
particular defendant be aware of the woman's resistance when prose-
cuted for raping her or even trying to do so. I do not say these positions
are necessarily wrong. The protection of the consumer, the environ-
ment, and of women from these harms is a legitimate, even urgent,
good. Sometimes the urgency is great enough to make a case for com-
promising our commitment to justice to the individual. As Justice
Holmes observed, with characteristic bluntness, what "accounts for the
law's indifference to a man's particular temperament, faculties, and so
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forth" is that "public policy sacrifices the individual to the general
good." This is a problem not unique to criminal law. It is encountered in
every field of law. The hard questions are why and how and when and
how much-questions of great importance for any legal system and wor-
thy of all the attention we can give them.
S. I do not know-can I be completely candid?
P. How can I say no?
S. You do tend to get lyrical while talking about your subject, but in
the end what does it come to? You speak of concern for justice as a
justification for concern with the substantive criminal law, but how
much does it touch what really matters? The world is rife with immense
social wrongs-poverty, discrimination, inequalities, degrading jails and
prisons. What we need is blueprints for massive reform and you give us
exquisite line drawings.
P. We seem to be back where we were a while ago. All I can say is
that the shape of the substantive criminal law has a bearing on the
moral conditions of any society. It is not everything. A just and sound
criminal law will not eliminate the evils you speak of, but an unjust and
ill-considered one will surely add to those evils. Consider a world as it is
now, with all the injustices that rankle you, but with a criminal law that
has abandoned personal responsibility as a touchstone. Only harm or the
threat of harm need be shown to trigger the state's authority to punish.
Once that were shown there would be no escape unless a judge or an of-
ficial so chose. There would be very little to argue because there would
be very little law. It would be all the same whether the person meant
the harm, or was negligent, or was himself blameless. There would be
no excuse or justification which legally checked the power of officials. I
leave the rest to your imagination. Whenever you are inclined to think
of the criminal law as small potatoes-as "exquisite line drawings," in
your phrase-think of what our society would be like with a criminal
law shorn of its commitment to the concept of moral responsibility.
S. I am beginning to see why we look at things so differently. You see
the doctrines of criminal law as serving the traditional libertarian
values of individual responsibility and you seem to think those values
are the most important in the world. I just cannot get as fired up about
them as you do. For me the greatest threat to our democratic society
comes from the gross inequality in the distribution of resources and the
degradation and deprivation of the poor and the minorities who are
denied their rights. Therefore, when I look at the criminal law, I am less
impressed with its finely drawn principles of blame and responsibility
than with the people who are victimized by it-the poor and the
minorities whose neglect represents the greatest injustice in our society.
P. That is a fair statement, though I am not inclined to think it leaves
our positions as irreconcilable as you imply. There are situations in
Id at 48.
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which the values of liberty and equality conflict, but I do not think this
is one of them. Corrective justice and distributive justice are both cen-
tral features of our morality. We do not deny the one in praising the
other. As for the great majority of defendants and prisoners being the
poor and minorities, I do not deny this either, and I am sympathetic
with your resentment. However, as I tried to say before, the cause of
this is not in any meaningful sense the substantive criminal law, but
social conditions quite remote from it. It behooves you from your
perspective as well as me from mine to respect the importance of a just
and rational body of substantive criminal law.
S. We should end on a note of harmony and that is as close to it as we
are likely to get. Thanks, Professor.
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